We discuss an incentivizing market and model-based approach to design the energy management and control systems which realize high-quality ancillary services in dynamic power grids. Under the electricity liberalization, such incentivizing market should secure a high speed market-clearing by using the market players' private information well. Inspired by contract theory in microeconomics field, we propose a novel design method of such incentivizing market based on the integration of the economics models and the dynamic grid model. The conventional contract problems are analyzed for static systems or dynamical systems with control inputs directly operated by the principal. The analysis is, however, in discord with the incentivizing market. The main challenge of our approach is to reformulate the contract problems adapted to the market from the system and control perspective. We first establish the fundamental formulae for optimal incentive and control design, and clarify the basic properties of the designed market. We also discuss possibilities and limitation in the direction of our approach.
Introduction
Achieving a quality assurance of electric energy, called the ancillary service, is a key target of next-generation energy management and control systems for dynamic electric smart grids where electricity liberalization is fully enforced and renewable energy is highly penetrated [1] . Frequency, voltage and power controls, which are typical contents of the ancillary service, have been technical requirements for the electric energy supplier (e.g., see [2] , [3] ). Since the electricity liberalization starts, such ancillary control services have been investigated and realized in competitive electricity markets [4] - [6] . In view these, future energy management and control systems should include ancillary service markets with some incentive mechanisms as core elements to provide high-quality and fast-response control services to the extent of the primary level. Moreover, if we need ancillary control services of transient state, ancillary service markets should include physical models of dynamic power grids. In this article, we propose an incentivizing market-based approach in order to design the energy management and control systems which realize high-quality ancillary services in such dynamic power grids. Using this approach, we develop a design method of such incentivizing market based on the integration of the economics models and the dynamic grid model. We also provide fundamental conditions and formulae for the incentivizing market design.
Our approach is developed under the assumption that an energy dispatch scheduling on a future time interval has been finished in a spot energy market at the tertiary control level [7] , [8] , e.g., for one hour future interval and that each agent has a linearized model of his/her own system along the scheduled trajectory over the future time interval. For this linear time-varying model, we formulate a design problem of energy management and control systems based on a real-time regulation market, called the ancillary market, at the secondary and primary control levels [7] , [8] . Participants in the dynamic electric smart grid are consumers, suppliers or prosumers, called agents, who control their physical system selfishly according to their own criterion, and utility (independent public commission), who integrates economically all the controls of agents into a high-quality power demand and supply. In the integration, a market mechanism is adopted inevitably in order to secure selfish behaviors of agents in electricity liberalization; that is, each agent bids his/her certain private information in response to a market-clearing price, while utility (auctioneer) clears the market based on the bidding and decides the prices, in real-time.
The market model in our approach is characterized by two terminologies: "private information" and "incentivizing market". An iterative market-clearing model so-called the tâtonnement model does not need rigorous models, but does not generally guarantee the convergence to a specified equilibrium. Moreover, if it converges, the tâtonnement model takes a long time to converge at a market clearing equilibrium. To overcome the issues, we propose a novel model-based and market-based approach that designs first some incentives for the agents to report their private information (including their own model information) to the utility in the market, and makes it possible to realize a high speed market-clearing. This approach needs incentivizing costs, and the resulting optimization process can be recognized as an intermediate model (the second best model) between two extremal models, namely the tâtonnement model and the so-called supply/demand function equilibrium model (the first best model) which uses for free all agents' rigorous models, i.e., agents' private information. We provide this approach with fundamental formulae and tools to design the incentivizing mechanism in the market and the corresponding optimal control, and discuss the basic properties of the designed market. We also discuss the relationships of our incentivizing mechanism with the Lagrange multiplier based integration/decomposition mechanism and the mechanism design. We also discuss possibilities and limitation of our approach.
This article has been organized as follows: Section 2 introduces a dynamic power grid model and a model-based incentivizing market model and we derive some theoretical results on a general reward design problem in Section 3. In Section 4, we show the relationship between the private information and the incentives and discuss possibilities and limitation of our approach through three typical scenarios. In Section 5, we summarize the results.
Grid Model and Incentivizing Market Model
Two Layers Market: In this paper, we consider the two level architecture with the two layers market; spot energy market and real-time regulation market. The temporally-separated architecture [7] , [8] motivated by the conventional power system control is divided into the primary control level (voltage and frequency stabilization), the secondary control level (quasi-stationary power imbalance control) and the tertiary control level (economic dispatch). The two layers market reorganizes the conventional three-level architecture according to the functions of the markets. Our approach is developed under the assumption that an energy dispatch scheduling on a future time interval has been finished in a spot energy market (at the tertiary level), and that each agent has a linearized model of his/her own system along the scheduled trajectory over the time interval. For this linear time-varying model, we formulate a design problem of energy management and control systems to realize ancillary services based on a real-time regulation market (at the secondary and primary levels).
Linearized Grid Model: Let us first consider the linearized time-varying model used in the ancillary market. This paper considers one of the standard grid models, the average system frequency model [9] , as a generic model of high speed response for ancillary service control problems with two area power networks and with two kinds of players: Utility and Agents. Here we present a linearized model of each player's own system along the scheduled trajectory over a future time interval during when an energy dispatch scheduling has been finished in a spot energy market (at the tertiary control level). Of course, it is straightforward to extend the problem to the arbitrary number of agents.
The utility dynamics, which describes the deviation of the power and/or frequency balance and other deviations from physical constraints as well, obeys the following equation:
and is evaluated by the utility's revenue functional:
where 0 1 2 ( , , )
is the collection of the states of the utility dynamics and the agents' dynamics and 1 2 ( , ) 
and is evaluated by the agent's revenue functional:
The state i x of agent i indicates typically the deviation of power generation or consumption from the scheduled trajectory; the control i u compensates the deviation. An admissible control of agent i , denoted as i i u ∈ Γ , is a state feedback ( , )
it i u u t x = defined by:
and Lipschitz continuous in
To simplify the description in the following, let us describe the grid dynamics by combining the utility dynamics (1) and the agent's dynamics (3) as follows:
where 00 0 01 1 02 2
We need the following assumptions, which make the discussions in this paper mathematically rigorous. The notions / 
, , u u u = derived by dynamic programming. We will discuss possibilities of other options in Section 4. To achieve the objective, we reformulate our problems on the future time interval from the current time t to the final time f t based on the time-consistency property. To describe formulas concisely, we adopt the continuous-time model in this article; we can develop in parallel the same results in the discrete-time model. On the other hand, to develop our discussion in the continuous-time model in a mathematically sound way, we need some technical assumptions as stated above and in the later discussion; however, the assumptions except that on convexity (or concavity) are for assuring an appropriate smoothness and boundedness of the variables appearing in the discussions, but not essential for developing our key ideas.
Incentivizing Market Model: To describe market mechanism, we need to specify participant's private information. W so as to emphasize the dependence of i W on the choice of the parameter w . In the following discussion, we often use the same notation to show such parameter dependence. We try to express the parameter w with another parameter h , which we call the price, so that the reward functional depends on the choice of the price h ; then such dependence is also denoted as
The reward functionals together with the utility's revenue functional and the agent's revenue functional define the social welfare functional as: 
I t x u J t x u E W t x u
and the agent's profit functional as: 
A market planner designs a market mechanism with incentivizing structures and makes auction rules as well, based on the evaluation functionals and the grid model information introduced so far; the auction is performed in the following five steps:
Step 1: Utility announces the auction system, and agents decide participation.
Step 2: Agent offers his/her bid based on his/her own private information.
Step 3: Based on agents' bids, price is determined so as to maximize social welfare.
Step 4: Agent decides his/her control to maximize his/her own profit based on price.
Step 5: Utility pay rewards to agents. Note that Steps 2, 3 and 4 will be performed continuously over a finite time interval.
3. Model-based One-shot Market Mechanism
Reward Design for Incentivizing
Components of our market model and their general interplay have been described in the previous section. To complete our market model, we need to fix a concrete shape of agents' bidding, and design reward functionals by choosing their characterizing parameter, called the reward parameter, 1 2 ( , ) w w w = . First, let us specify agents' private information to be bidden in the market model discussed here: Each agent's model information ( , , )
is sent a priori to utility, and each agent's on-line information to be bidden is just the current state, i.e., it it x Ζ = , which means that utility cannot access control input i u . Then, the design problem of our market is reduced to a social welfare maximization problem, called the reward design problem, subject to the constraints that provide the market with two incentivizing functions by rewards, which is formulated as follows: 
By solving this problem, we obtain the optimal reward functional with two incentive functions and the agents' optimal controls. Constraint 1 claims that the reward incentivizes each agent's behavior to adopt the optimal control that maximizes her own profit and, in other words, constitutes a Nash equilibrium together with the other agent's control. This also implies that, since the utility holds the bidden models, the utility can know the control profile, even if it is not bidden. On the other hand, Constraint 2 assures a prescribed level of each agent's profit. The above formulation is an application of the moral hazard problem in contract theory [10] , [11] to our market design problem; using terminology of contract theory, we call Constraint 1 and Constraint 2 the incentive compatibility constraint and the individual rationality constraint, respectively. The conventional contract (moral hazard) problems analyzed for static systems and dynamical systems with control inputs directly operated by the principal [10] . The analysis is, however, in discord with the incentivizing market. The main challenge of our incentivizing market design is to reformulate the moral problems adapted to the market as above and synthesize the proposed market from the system and control perspective.
Solutions for General Reward Design
To solve the reward design problem, we start specifying a form of the reward functionals by using Constraints 1 and 2. For a parameter 
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along with ( , , ( , ), ( , )) ( ) 
Moreover,
, which constitute a Nash equilibrium, must satisfy
arg max ( , ) ( , , ) ( , , ) , 
along with
(b) For the reward functionals (11) with a parameter 1 2 ( , ) h h h = ∈ Η × Η , a pair of controls Proof: (a) We have already seen that, for a chosen parameter 1 2 ( , ) w w w = ∈ Π × Π , the reward functionals for which 1 2 ( , )
w w u u constitutes a Nash equilibrium must have the form (9) with the parameters (9a) and (9b), and the Nash equilibrium must be given as 
